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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to research how the slow process of land redistribution in 
South Africa can be accelerated, given the urgency of land resettlement. A sub-
programme of redistribution, Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), 
was launched by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs in A1.}gust 2001. A 
redistribution project goes through five phases (refer Appendix A for LRAD project 
cycle). Each phase has different steps, which is an LRAD project cycle. Firstly, the thesis 
analyses the project cycle - the aim was to establish how long it would take a farmer to 
obtain ownership of land and how the process can be expedited to settle more farmers. 
Secondly, it studies the role and views of stakeholders involved in the programme (such 
as NGOs, financial (nstitutions, design agents and governmental departments). Thirdly, it 
examines the performance and progress made since the implementation of the 
programme In KwaZulu-Natal. Lastly, the study focuses on problems and general 
concerns regarding the policy. Some policy recommendations on the need and 
performance of land redistribution in South Africa are made. 
The LRAD project cycle could take at least nine months or more. During this period 
beneficiaries cannot buy land from auctions, while some landowners are reluctant to go 
through with this long process, because it may not result in a land sale. Engaging 
property owners in the process can accelerate land delivery. In addition, government 
must try to streamline its policies and procedures, so that landowners who wish to sell 
do not perceive it to be such a serious disadvantage to engage in selling to redistribution 
applicants. The LRAD programme started slowly in KwaZulu-Natal and by the end of 
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April 2002, the DLA had received only 105 applications for the grant. By May 2003, 
out of 1 300 applications only 169 had been transferred since LRAD started. According 
to experience by Ithala Bank, many projects are delayed and sales collapse. Long 
delays are a major problem, because many projects are approved but few transferred . A 
recommendation is that commercial banks be given a chance to approve LRAD grants, 
contingent on loan approval. Extending approval powers to commercial banks has the 
advantage of identifying creditworthy projects quickly and accurately, as private lenders 
are putting their own resources at risk. 
Some of the problems and concerns identified around LRAD are: disposal of state land 
and unresolved land-claims. The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) needs to integrate 
the new programme with other programmes of land reform, especially in cases where 
different communities are competing for the same land, but through different 
programmes. Another problem is that the programme has missed market opportunities 
because landowners are reluctant to sell due to delays and uncertainty. The DLA has 
consistently been under-spending their budget, leading to their budget being cut. 
Financial assistance to farmers with no own collateral is insufficient. The farmers are 
not being placed in a financial position to purchase a viable farm and they will 
experience serious cash flow problems if maximum loans from the Land Bank are 
accessed. The Department of Agriculture (DoA) has postponed the training programme 
several times and to date it is not yet implemented. It is highly recommended that the 
issue of mentorship be addressed, as a matter of urgency. 
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When South Africa's first democratic government came into power III 1994, land 
reform was among its policy priorities. It is one of the ways in which past racial 
exclusions and inequalities are being addressed (Hall and Williams, 2000). Land policy 
efforts have since then been directed towards land restitution (return of, or 
compensation for, land dispossessed after 1913), tenure reform (resettling of farm 
workers and labour tenants through land claims courts and improving tenure security in 
the former homelands) and land redistribution (transfer or redistribution of land to 
previously disadvantaged groups for residential and productive purposes) (Department 
of Land Affairs, 1997). Among these three elements, land redistribution was intended 
to be the leading edge of the programme, transferring 30 % of white-owned farmland to 
previously disadvantaged households over five years, now fifteen years. The main 
instrument of land redistribution was a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) of 
R16 000 provided to households or groups to purchase land from willing sellers, 
including the State. Groups of beneficiaries were formed in almost all the provinces 
(Kirsten et al., 1996). 
Land reform implementation was difficult from the beginning, although not all 
difficulties encountered related directly to the programme. The DLA was a new 
organisation that, for some years, was constrained by a lack of capacity in terms of 
staff numbers and skills (Hornby, 1998), together with tensions between new and old 
bureaucracies and bureaucrats. 
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Unfortunately, the land redistribution programme proceeded at a slow pace during its 
first few years of operation. Taken together, restitution and redistribution transferred 
roughly one million hectares, or less than 1.2 % of the area available for redistribution, 
to previously disadvantaged South Africans during the period 1994 to 2000 in 
KwaZulu-Natal (Lyne, 2001). By March 1999, around 65 000 hectares of land were 
approved for redistribution, representing less than 1 % of the country's commercial 
farmland (National Land Committee, 2001). Graham and Lyne (1999) found that, in 
KwaZulu-Natal, private purchases redistributed more land wealth than did government-
assisted transactions. 
Some of the maJ0f reasons for the slow pace and poor performance of land 
redistribution (SLAG programme) are: First, the excessive centralization of 
administration that required ministerial approval for every project and a cumbersome 
grant approval procedure (Kirsten & Van Zyl, 1999); Second, it is not economically 
feasible to partition large commercial farms into much smaller, affordable units in 
situations where many resources are indivisible (e.g. packsheds, irrigation equipment 
and machinery), and the costs of surveying, transferring and registering sub-divisions 
are high (Simms, 1997) and, thirdly, prospective farmers lack capital and are unable to 
finance land with mortgage loans from commercial banks due to cash flow problems 
caused by relatively high inflation rates and concomitant high nominal interest rates 
while current returns to land are relatively lower (Nieuwoudt & Vink, 1995). 
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The DLA has routinely failed to spend its budget, and most of its expenditure has been 
for salaries rather than for purchasing land (Hall and Williams, 2000). The quality of 
land delivered was poor, with many beneficiaries forced to pool their grants with other 
applicants in order to purchase a farm. This created problems of artificially constructed 
communities, comprising different and competing land needs (NLC, 2001). These 
problems were often compounded by weaknesses (such as lack of incentives and 
inability to agree on rules of land use) in communal landholding entities, or Communal 
Property Associations (CPAs), and a lack of after care support, including lack of basic 
amenities , services and production support. De Villiers (2000) observed that only 
between 10 % and 15 % of listed beneficiaries of ep As in the Northern Province were 
involved in active farming, while a large number of grant beneficiaries submitted their 
names merely to purchase the farm and showed no interest in, or commitment to, the 
actual farming activities. 
In 2000, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, announced a new 
direction to the redistribution policy, namely Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD). The LRAD programme aims to transfer 30% of the country's 
agricultural land to disadvantaged people over 15 years (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs, 2001). Since the launch of this programme, LRAD has been the main 
tool of redistribution. This programme differs from the SLAG programme in a major 
respect: beneficiaries do not have to be poor to qualify for the minimum grant of R20 
000, and those who have more savings and who can raise bigger loans to finance their 
farms will qualify for larger grants, the maximum being R100 000. Application is also 
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based on an individual and not on a household basis. This represents a paradigm shift 
in government's land redistribution policy , away from poverty alleviation and group 
settlement, in favour of settling emerging farmers on their own farms. A major problem 
with LRAD is that a farmer with no collateral cannot purchase a viable undertaking 
unless he has significant part time income. This problem is somewhat alleviated if 
LRAD is coupled with the Land Bank' s loan programme. 
Since the outbreak of farm invasions in Zimbabwe in 2000, the importance of 
addressing land issues has greatly increased, with groupings across the political and 
social spectrum, from the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) to AgriSA, calling for an 
acceleration of the pace of reform (Lahiff, 2001). There has also been a marked 
increase in popular mobilization around land issues and a growing willingness by 
landless people to take direct action to acquire land. The experience with land reform in 
Zimbabwe, both during the early stage and the present situation, should provide useful 
guidelines for the new policy focus in South Africa. 
Experience with the land reform programme has shown that it takes time to develop 
systems and mechanisms to implement new programmes. The LRAD programme is 
now in its second year and policies have been put in place and a mechanism of delivery 
has been developed. Even with LRAD there is concern about the slow pace of land 
redistribution in South Africa. The main objective of this study is to find out how the 
process of land redistribution can be accelerated, given the urgency of land resettlement 
in South Africa. A redistribution project of the LRAD programme goes through five 
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phases, each phase with different steps, which is an LRAD project cycle. Firstly, the 
study will analyse the project cycle - the aim being to establish how long it will take a 
farmer to get ownership of land and how the process can be expedited to settle more 
farmers. Secondly, it will look at the role of stakeholders involved in the programme 
(such as NGOs, financial institutions, design agents and government departments). 
Thirdly, the performance and progress made since the implementation of the 
programme in KwaZulu-Natal will be evaluated. Lastly, the study will focus on 
problems and general concerns regarding the policy and make some policy 
recommendations on the need and performance of land redistribution in South Africa. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter I presents a background on South 
African land reform. The topic mostly highlights how the programme was developed and 
discusses the three elements ofland reform (tenure reform, restitution and redistribution) 
in more detail. Past performance of land redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal is also 
discussed in this chapter. Chapter 2 focuses mainly on the new programme, LRAD. The 
policy is discussed in more detail in order to provide a basis for understanding 
stakeholder responses. The results of the study are discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. Chapter 
3 presents the analysis of the project cycle and the role and responses of stakeholders. 
Chapter 4 presentsLRAD performance and progress made in KwaZulu-Natal since 
implementation. Problems and other concerns regarding the programme are discussed in 





The attainment of a hard-won democracy in South Africa after the -1994 general 
elections was accompanied by high expectations of the ANC-led government to 
transform property rights dramatically and to reverse the history of land dispossession 
(Tilley, 2002). The new government undertook the challenge of redressing the daunting 
historical legacy inherited by its administration; 87 % of the land was owned by the 
white minority, while the black majority owned 13 % of the land. 
South African land reform policy was formed in terms of three broad areas , viz . 
restitution, tenure reform and redistribution. The key focus points were poverty 
reduction and the redistribution of land to the dispossessed poor, farm workers, 
women, labour tenants and emerging farmers . The Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development is a sub-programme of redistribution and will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2. 
1.1 Background to South African Land Reform 
South Africa's legacy of racially based land ownership was formalised in 1913 when 
the Natives Land Act was promulgated. Black land ownership was restricted to "native 
reserves" , where tribal chiefs applied customary land tenure . The 1936 Native Trust 
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and Land Act expanded the area of these "homelands" to 6.2 million hectares, or about 
13 % of the national area (Darroch and Lyne, 2002) These laws prevented "non-whites" 
from owning commercial farmland, whilst other laws prevented white farmers from 
leasing their land to black tenants and sharecroppers. 
As early as 1993, the World Bank, arguably the institution most dedicated to the 
protection of private property rights in the world, warned that if post-apartheid South 
Africa did not undertake "a major restructuring of the rural economy centred on 
significant land transfers and smaller scale agricultural production units", the country 
faced the danger of rural violence and possibly even civil war (Thwala, 2003). It was 
against this backdrop, and amid growing concerns about the need to inspire the 
confidence of foreign investors in a rapidly globalising world economy, that South 
Africa's multiparty constitutional negotiators approached the thorny question of whether 
and how to reverse the centuries' old racial maldistribution of the country's 122 million 
hectares of land. 
Later policy documents and statutory laws drafted by the new government, including 
the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the 1997 White 
Paper on South African Land Policy, further committed the government to redistribute 
30% of agricultural land. The adjudication process on land restitution claims was to be 
completed in the first five years of South Africa's democracy (1994-1999). The 
government was committed to a land reform programme that would address "the 
injustices of racially-based land dispossession of the past; the need for land reform to 
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reduce poverty and contribute to economic growth; security of tenure for all; and a 
system of land management which will support sustainable land use patterns and rapid 
land release for development", respectively. Another policy, released in 1997, was the 
Land Reform Gender Policy. The Policy "aimed at creating an enabling environment 
for women to access, own, control, use and manage land; as well as access credit for 
productive use of the land". The Policy further committed the Ministry and Department 
of Land Affairs to an extensive set of guiding principles to actively promote the 
principle of gender equity in land reform. 
In addition to the RDP, the government adopted a neo-liberal macro-economic policy -
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) . This macro-economic 
framework respects the protection of private property rights, advocates reliance on 
market forces and promotes fiscal restraint through tightly controlled public spending. 
Overall, GEAR aimed to reduce state intervention in the economy. In the spirit of 
GEAR, the government supported the World Bank - promoted "market-assisted" 
approach to development and social transformation. One outcome of GEAR was a 
massive deregulation of the previously heavily protected and subsidised agricultural 
sector. Agricultural budgets have been cut and the marketing boards set up by the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1968 have been abolished (Fox, 2000). These market-
oriented shifts have been so extensive that South African agriculture is now one of the 
least state-protected agricultural sectors in the world and probably better able to adjust 
to global market conditions. 
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1.2 Three aspects of land reform in South Africa 
Three cornerstones of land reform (redistribution, restitution and tenure reform) are 
discussed. 
1.2.1 Land redistribution 
Land redistribution aims to provide the poor with access to land for residential and 
productive use, in order to secure their tenure and improve their livelihoods. It aims to 
assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women and emergent farmers, based on 
the "willing seller/willing buyer" principle, to acquire land with full rights of 
ownership . Lahiff (2001) states that the original aim of this programme has been lost, 
that redistribution and land reform have come to focus on technical criteria for access to 
the programme and on the type of land use that should be supported. 
Land redistribution is not simply a legal transfer from the current landowner to a buyer . 
It is a long process that begins with the articulation of a land need, land identification, 
applications and negotiations, beneficiary identification, land use planning and 
formation of legal entity. These processes take place before the actual transfer of the 
land. Most of the delays come from problems that originate from these processes. For 
example, various people contest land, disagreements arise on how land should be 
owned and used and government is constrained by budgets (Mkhize and Mwelase, 
1996). 
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As part of this programme, the government awarded beneficiaries a Settlement Land 
Acquisition Grant (which started at R15 000 and was later fixed at R16 000). Groups of 
beneficiaries were formed in almost all the provinces (Kirsten et al., 1996). Beneficiary 
households had to pool their meager grants in order to buy a farm from a willing seller. 
This was due largely to the Sub-division of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970 that 
not only limits the subdivisions of farms into smaller parcels of land, but also prohibits 
co-ownership in undivided shares of farmland by individuals other than husband and 
wife. The delay in repealing the Sub-division Act is attributed to the absence of zoning 
legislation regulating the conversion of farmland into residential or commercial use 
(Graham, 2000). In the meantime, subdivision of farmland requires approval by the 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs .ft" 
Various categories of redistribution projects have been provided for, including group 
settlement with some production; individual production; commonage schemes; on-farm 
settlement; share equity schemes; rapid land release in an urban context; and others that 
hinge on policy innovation (Camay and Gordon, 2000). Groups of buyers had to 
establish a legal entity, usually a Community Land Trust (CL T) or Communal Property 
Association (CPA) , to take ownership of the land. Beneficiaries of the SLAG 
programme were not required to make a financial contribution towards the purchase of 
land and, as a result, few listed beneficiaries of CPAs were involved in active farming. 
Also, a large number of grant beneficiaries submitted their names merely to purchase 
the farm and thereafter showed no interest in, and commitment to, actual farming 
activities (De Villiers, 2000). 
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Most beneficiaries took up residential sites and went on with their multiple rural 
livelihood survival strategies. Since individuals have their own differences and 
expectations, decision-making by the established CPA, although democratic, does not 
necessarily address every member's needs. Furthermore, beneficiaries do not have 
tangible proof that they own the land. Title to the land is vested in the legal entity. If 
beneficiaries decide to leave the Trust or the CPA, the possibility exists that they may 
lose their rights to the land if they are not aware of all the various legal procedures that 
need to be followed. They also have no second opportunity to access the grant (Tilley, 
2002). 
In 1994, the post-apartheid government forecast land redistribution at the rate of six 
million hectares per year (Lyne and Roth, 2002). Progress with land reform has fallen 
far short of the goals set by the government. This argument is based on the DLA's 
performance between the years 1994 and 2001. The Department only delivered 1.2 
percent of commercial agricultural land or 1 098 008 hectares (Kepe and Cousins, 
2002). The greatest number of hectares approved for transfer was in 1998, when about 
0.33 % of all commercial farmland was redistributed (NLC, 2001). 
Through the DLA, the government suspended the land redistribution programme in 
1999 and 2000, to allow for an intensive review of its role in land delivery. The 
parameters of this review were defined by the government's search for economic 
efficiency, a central focus of the Gear strategy. This led to changes centred on the 
decentralisation of land reform delivery, an emphasis on increasing the speed of 
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delivery and a greater stress on market production. A major new goal emerging from 
the review was the development of an African commercial farming class, able to 
compete with the country's historically white agricultural sector. The Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme resulting from this 
review was finally launched in August 2001 and is now the official -redistribution 
programme of the Department (to be discussed in Chapter 2). 
1.2.2 Land restitution 
The aim of this programme is the restoration of land or the payment of compensation to 
people who were previously dispossessed of their land as a result of discriminatory 
legislation and apartheid policies. The scope of this programme only includes people 
who were dispossessed of their land as from 1913. Those who lost their land before 
1913, through wars of conquest, colonisation or other forms of dispossession, are 
excluded. The Government's policy and procedure for land claims are based on the 
provisions of the Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act, No. 22 of 1994. 
A restitution claim qualifies for investigation by the Commission provided that the 
claimant was dispossessed of a right to land after 19 June 1913 under, or for the object 
of, a racially discriminatory law or was not paid just and equitable compensation if 
expropriated under the Expropriation Act. 
Soon after the passing of the Restitution of Land Rights Act a five-member Commission 
for the Restitution of Land Rights was appointed. A three-year period, during which 
13 
people could lodge claims according to the provisions of the Act, started on 1 May 
1995. The deadline (May 1998) for submitting claims was later extended to December 
1998. A total of 68 878 restitution claims (the highest number from KwaZulu-Natal, 
with 14 808 claims) were registered with the Land Claims Commission, which 
investigates the validity of each claim and recommends a resolution to the Land Claims 
Court for approval or adjudication in the event that a claim is contested (DLA, 2002). 
Of the total number validated, about 400 of the claims are not valid (DLA, 2003a). 
During the formative years of 1994-99, the restitution process turned out to be 
legalistic, bureaucratic and slow (Turner and Ibsen, 2000). However, following 
amendments to the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1997 and 1999 (giving claimants 
direct access to Land Claims Court without first going to the Commission and 
delegating the power to resolve uncontroversial claims to regional Commissions) and an 
instruction to the Commission by the Pesident, Thabo Mbeki, to finalise all land claims 
by the end of 2005, the rate at which claims are being processed has improved 
remarkably. By the end of July 2003, 40 323 claims have been settled (28 555 claims 
still outstanding), with a total of 781 493 hectares of land restored and benefiting 526 
249 people (DLA, 2003b). 
The vast majority of settled claims are in urban areas and derived from forced removals 
under the Group Areas Act. In many cases, land restitution took the form of monetary 
compensation, as opposed to the original land or similar land being provided as 
restitution. In most urban claims, restoration of the claimant's original land is not 
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feasible, as the land has invariably been developed in some way. In most rural claims, 
people desire to return to their original land or, if this is not possible, to settle on 
alternative land. Far fewer claims have been resolved in the provinces where rural 
claims are found in large numbers, particularly Mpumalanga, Northern Province and 
KwaZulu-Natal - and which also have the highest quality agricultural land under claim 
(Lahiff, 2001) . The prioritisation and rapid settlement of urban claims has been 
criticised as politically expedient, because urban claims tend to be high-profile cases, 
earning government better publicity (NLC, 2000). Turner and Ibsen (2000) raised a 
concern that restitution was not sufficiently integrated in the development process and 
this reinforced claimants' status as victims, rather than as empowered people claiming 
their rights. 
1.2.3 Tenure Reform 
The South African Constitution states that a person or a community whose tenure of 
land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is 
legally secure, or to comparable redress. Steps were taken to strengthen the land rights 
of occupants on commercial farms, and land tenure rights in general, through a number 
of pieces of legislation. The 1996 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act provides for the 
protection of the rights of labour tenants and gives them the right to claim land. The 
1996 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act was passed as an interim measure 
to protect people in the former homelands against abuses of their land rights by corrupt 
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chiefs, administrative measures or property developers who fail to consult the occupiers 
of affected land, while a new comprehensive law was being prepared. The Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act (EST A) of 1997 aims to protect people who live on land with 
the consent of the owner or person-in-charge against unfair eviction and create long-
term tenure security through on-or-off-site settlement assisted by a government grant 
and the landowner. 
The Communal Land Rights Bill has yet to be finalised and currently leaves many 
questions unanswered. According to the NLC (2001), the Bill undermines established 
occupation rights and opens up opportunities for the transfer of state land to 
"communities" controlled by powerful and sometimes traditional leaders who cannot be 
held to account. With the NLC as its mouthpiece, many development activists suggest 
that the draft Land Rights Bill should be scrapped and that a truly consultative process 
of drafting be initiated by the DLA, to ensure that the land rights of South Africans 
living on communal land are adequately secured. 
1.3 Other forms of redistribution 
In addition to the government's land redistribution programme, private and semi-private 
initiatives have emerged to redistribute farmland to previously disadvantaged people. 
These initiatives include private land purchases and equity sharing schemes. 
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1.3.1 Private land purchases 
Most creditworthy farmers did not qualify for SLAG, as the means test that applied to 
potential beneficiaries precluded individuals with a monthly household income greater 
than R1500. They therefore resorted to buying land privately, with mortgage loans. 
However, conventional mortgage loans amortized with constant payments of principal, 
plus interest, created severe cash flow (liquidity) problems for borrowers during the 
early years of their enterprise, when inflation rates were high (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 
1995). 
According to Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995), the cash flow problems arise because 
inflation increases nominal interest rates on mortgage loans while deferring returns 
(future returns on land are increased by inflation). This creates temporary, but severe, 
cash flow problems to service debt repayments for borrowers, who are unable to make 
a substantial down payment on the purchase price of the farm. The liquidity problem 
diminishes over time, as inflation raises future earnings relative to the fixed loan 
repayments. In other words, the farmers' debt repayment capacity improves over time, 
in line with inflation. Therefore, the initial cash flow problems can be removed by 
providing an interest rate subsidy that diminishes at the expected rate of inflation, over 
a finite period of time (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1995). The subsidy allows for a below-
market interest rate to be charged in the early years of the bond, making it possible for 
the new farmer to meet his or her instalment payments from the limited cash flow 
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earned by the enterprise during its early, critical years. The approach outlined by 
Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995) was partially adopted by Ithala Bank in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Ithala Bank has facilitated private land ' transactions since 1996 (Lyne et al., 1999). 
Earlier, when the Illovo Sugar Company invited applications for 20 medium-scale 
sugarcane farms (ranging from 55 to 105 hectares in area), none of the more than 100 
disadvantaged applicants could afford an equity contribution large enough to reduce the 
size of a conventional mortgage loan to a level that could be serviced from farm 
income (Lyne and Darroch, 1997). To mitigate this problem, the Company agreed to 
sell the farms at market-related prices and invest 18 % of the purchase price with Ithala 
Bank. This capital,- plus interest accrued, funds a finite interest rate subsidy for the 
borrower (Simms, 1996). In effect, Illovo Sugar Company discounted the prices of its 
land by 18 %, and Ithala Bank used the private subsidy to reduce the current mortgage 
loan rate from 16.5 % to 10 % in the first year. The subsidy then declines to zero at the 
end of year six, in line with expected increases in nominal income associated with an 
annual inflation rate of roughly 10%. The buyer pays the full annual interest rate of 
16.5 % for the remaining 14 years of the 20-year loan period. By 1999 this scheme had 
assisted approximately 90 disadvantaged farmers to acquire medium-sized sugar farms 
in KwaZulu-Natal (Graham and Lyne, 1999). 
One criticism of the above graduated repayment scheme is that it focused on medium-
scale farms and excluded smaller, more affordable farms that were creditworthy (Lyne 
and Darroch, 2003). The scheme emphasised medium-scale farms because the sugar 
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millers providing the interest subsidy insisted that land should be sold to full-time 
farmers and subdivision and transaction costs are largely fixed costs that raise the unit 
price of land as farm size diminishes. Other criticisms are that the subsidy is not 
sufficient and that part time farmers are excluded. 
1.3.2 Farm worker equity-sharing schemes (FWES) 
Mather and Adelzadeh (1997) describe farm worker equity schemes as 'a method of 
redistributing land without affecting the structure of individual farms or overall 
production; with better job satisfaction and a greater participation, productivity should 
increase on farms where workers are also owners'. Equity-sharing saves on a range of 
transaction costs such as subdivision costs, survey costs and transfer fees (Van Rooyen 
and Njobe, 1996), and has the advantage of redistributing wealth and income streams, 
as opposed to just land. In addition, unlike many other land reform projects, these 
FWES have empowered women. Findings from the case studies of the equity-sharing 
projects analysed by Knight and Lyne (2002) in 2001, showed that more than 50% of 
the farm worker shareholders were women, on six of nine projects analysed. 
1.4 Past performance of land redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal 
At the time of South Africa's political democratisation in 1994, 50.04% of the farmland 
(including provincial parks) area of 8.19 million hectares in KwaZulu-Natal was 
controlled by a small minority of white owners. It is estimated that 6 755 large-scale 
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commercial farms accounted for 4.13 million hectares (Lyne and Ortmann, 1996). Of 
the remaining 4.06 million hectares, 2.84 million hectares were occupied by some three 
million black South Africans under communal tenure, 0.04 million hectares were 
privately owned by 'non-whites' and 0.42 million hectares were farmed by the State 
itself (including forests) and the remaining 0.76 million hectares were used for 
provincial parks. 
Empirical evidence about the progress of land redistribution is scarce, especially if the 
relative performance of the government redistribution programme is compared to other 
modes of redistribution, such as private land purchases, as very little is known about 
private land purchases. Unfortunately, such comparative data only exist for KwaZulu-
Natal, where both government and private farmland transactions have been monitored 
annually since 1997. 
Between the years 1997 and 2001, 121 484 hectares, or 2.3% of farmland available for 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal, has been transferred to disadvantaged owners (Lyne and 
Darroch, 2003). Table 1.1 summarises the area of farmland acquired each year by 
disadvantaged owners in KwaZulu-Natal during the calendar years 1997-2001. The 
census estimate was used to compute the rate of land redistribution for each study year, 
by expressing area acquired by disadvantaged entrants as a percentage of total area of 
farmland potentially available for redistribution in the province (5.31 million hectares = 
4.13 million hectares owned by whites plus 1.18 million hectares of State farms and game 
parks) at the time of political democratisation in 1994. 
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Annual fannland transfers to the disadvantaged group ranged from 17 345 to 36 109 
hectares per year, representing between 5.8% and 11.8% of the fannland transferred 
annually. Although this rate is low, it is considerably higher than that of 0.09% estimated 
in 1995 by Lyne and Darroch (1997). This indicates that there has been a considerable 
growth in the rate of land redistribution in the province since 1995, albeit still far off the 
government's target. 
Table 1.1: Estimated annual rates of land redistribution to disadvantaged people in 
KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2001 
Study year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1. Area of farmla.nd originally 
5 308 559 5 308 559 5 308 559 5308559 5 308559 
available for redistribution (ha) 
2. Area of land transacted (ha) 372995 603522 306433 300799 
3. Area of land acquired by, or 
22934 17772 36 109 17345 
for, disadvantaged people (ha) 
4. Rate of land redistribution (%) 
0.43 0.34 0.68 0.33 
([number 3-;.-number 1] x 100) 
Source: Lyne and Darroch, 2003 
In their study, Lyne and Darroch (2003) continued to analyse transactions involving 
disadvantaged entrants according to the method of financing/acquisition - grant 
financed (government-assisted), private market transfers (mortgage loan financed or 





than government-assisted (89) transactions redistributed. The total area of farmland 
redistributed by private market purchases (60 266 hectares, this being 36 148 hectares 
via private mortgage loans and 24 118 hectares via cash purchase) comfortably 
exceeded that redistributed by the government-assisted transactions (45 121 hectares) 
and consisted of higher quality land (greater weighted farmland price per hectare). 
;;) More than half the farmland purchased by historically disadvantaged people in 
KwaZulu-Natal transferred to groups, not individuals. This poses a major challenge to 
policy makers, since farms acquired by groups of land reform beneficiaries already 
show symptoms of becoming open access resources (Lyne and Roth, 2002). The 
relatively poorer performance of government programmes in redistributing farmland, 
especially high quality land, has been compounded by other problems (Lyne and 
Darroch, 2003). Under the SLAG programme, diverse groups of beneficiaries 
struggled to assign exclusive property rights to individual beneficiaries, or to design 
and enforce sound constitutions to manage communal resources. Prospective farmers 
also lack capital and are unable to finance land with conventional mortgage loans from 
commercial banks due to cash flow problems caused by high nominal interest rates. 
However, the situation is expected to change now that the LRAD programme has 
replaced the SLAG programme. 
Land Redistribution is being characterised as poverty policy for rural South Africa (van 
Zyl et al., 1996a; DLA, 1997 and Deininger et al., 1999). Given that well over half of 
black rural people are poor and that they account for 71 % of poor households in South 
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Africa (Deininger and May, 2000), there is unquestionably a need for an anti-poverty 
programme that is specifically aimed at the rural poor. At the same time, given South 
Africa's sordid history of racial land expropriation, there is a political need for a racial 
restructuring of agricultural land ownership (Baber, 1991). 
23 
CHAPTER 2 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (LRAD) 
2.1 Basic features of LRAD 
The new programme, LRAD, went through a series of drafts before it was implemented 
and launched in August 2001. The policy provides for transfer of land to large, medium 
and small commercial farmers and to subsistence producers. Land for settlement, 
commonage and non-agricultural production activities are dealt with under different 
policies. The target of 30% for land redistribution amounts to about 24.6 million 
hectares, or an average of 1.64 million hectares every year over 15 years (Tilley, 
2002). At six times the amount of land transferred in 1998 (the most successful year for 
land redistribution, when 273 416 hectares were involved in project approvals and 
transfer) the annual average requires an extraordinary escalation in the rate of delivery. 
Some of the objectives of the new programme are to improve nutrition and incomes of 
rural poor who want to farm on any scale, to expand opportunities for women and young 
people staying in rural areas, to contribute to relieving the congestion in overcrowded 
former homeland areas and to empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and 
social well-being whilst, at the same time, promoting environmental sustainability of land 
and other natural resources. The LRAD grant and LRAD planning grant (maximum of 
15% of the total project costs) can be accessed by formerly disadvantaged South African 
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citizens aged 18 years or older, on an individual basis only, for agricultural projects. The 
means test no longer applies. All individual members (no longer households, as in the 
past) are eligible, regardless of income, provided they can offer their own contribution. 
People who have acquired land as a result of redistribution can acquire further land 
through the LRAD grant. Politicians, who hold public office, and civil s~rvants do not 
qualify and will not be eligible for the grant. 
LRAD offers grants on a sliding scale, ranging from R20 000 to RlOO 000, depending 
on the amount of the beneficiary's own contribution. Figure 2.1 shows how the value 
of the contribution matches the grant. The minimum contribution of R5 000 matches the 
grant of R20 000 a~d the maximum grant of RIOO 000 requires an own contribution of 
at least R400 000. Own contribution may include own labour (sweat equity) for up to 
R5 000 per applicant, which is to ensure that poor people can participate in the 
programme. In order for the applicant to claim the full R5 000 in own labour towards 
the own contribution requirement, the business plan has to show evidence that the 
applicant intends to devote a significant amount of own labour towards the 
establishment and operation of the project (Ministry for Agriculture and Land affairs, 
2001) . Beneficiaries may benefit several times through trading, although lifetime 
benefits for a single applicant are limited to an accumulated amount of RI00 000. 
Existing land holding cannot be counted towards own contribution and assets acquired 
by means of the grant cannot be counted as an own contribution when applying for an 
additional grant. 
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Sliding scale of grants and own contribution 
The minimum grant amount is R20 000 which can be accessed with an own contribution of 
R5 000. The maximum grant is RI 00 000, which will require an own contribution of at least 
R400 000. If the participant contributes more than this amount(s) he/she still can only access 
a grant of RIO 0 000. Between the minimum and maximum amount, a continuum of grant 
amounts is available, depending on the participants' own contribution (as highlighted in the 
graph). 
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Taking a range of own contributions as illustration, we have the following: 
Own contribution Matching grant Proportion of total cost 
R R % 
Own contribution Grant 
5000 20000 20 80 
35000 40871 46 54 
145000 68888 68 32 
400000 lOO 000 80 20 
Figure 2.1: LRAD: Sliding scale of grant and own contribution. Source: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001. 
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LRAD has proposed four basic redistribution projects to provide for the different needs 
of farmers (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001): 
(a) Food safety-net projects - the acquisition of land for crop or livestock 
production to sustain and improve household food security. 
(b) Equity schemes - beneficiaries buy into an existing farm operation and become 
both an employee and co-owner of the farm operation. It has been shown that 
the scheme provides a useful basis for preparing new black farming 
entrepreneurs to enter into commercial production (De Villiers, 2000). 
(c) Production for markets - participants will access the grant and combine it with 
normal bank loans, their own assets and cash, to improve existing farming 
operations. These types of farmers have more farming experience and expertise 
than those accessing land for subsistence or food safety-net type of projects . 
(d) Agriculture in communal areas - this is for people living in communal areas who 
already have a secure access to agricultural land, who need the grant to invest in 
their land for improving household food security or becoming more 
commercially oriented. 
Applicants for the grant are expected to live on or near the land and to work on it. 
After acquisition of the grant, beneficiaries are expected to participate in a training 
programme. If people choose to apply as a group, the number of individuals 
represented in the group scales the required own contribution and total grant upwards. 
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2.2 Key shifts in the programme 
LRAD differs from SLAG in important ways. One of the key principles underpinning 
the new policy is that beneficiaries should make at least the minimum contribution in 
kind, labour or cash. LRAD also appears to be more focused on individual settlement 
rather than the group settlement of SLAG. By making grants available to individuals 
rather than to households, it substantially increases the level of grant funding 
obtainable, since each adult in a household can apply. Under LRAD, a typical poor 
black household with three adults would, in theory, be able to obtain three grants of 
R20 000 each (a total of R60 000) rather than one grant of R16 000 under SLAG. 
LRAD is open to individuals or groups, although large groups are discouraged from 
applying. Group projects require the setting up of an appropriate legal entity, such as a 
communal property association (CPA), a trust or a close corporation. The new policy 
promotes gender equality, by allowing adult individuals to apply in their own right, 
rather than as members of a household. This will facilitate grants for "women-only" 
projects. It may also enable households to maximize benefits by aggregating grants of 
individuals . Furthermore, at least one third of transferred land must accrue to women. 
The policy does not, however, explain how this will be achieved. 
, The programme is described as '4emand-=-1!:~d', meaning that beneficiaries themselves 
must define the type of project in which they wish to engage and, with appropriate 
assistance, identify available land. Zimmerman (2000) criticized demand-led targeting, 
as participation requirements will tend to favour those who already have a reasonably 
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strong asset base and will tend to exclude those who have nothing . In response, it may 
be pointed out that the poor receive a minimum grant. Requiring some contribution 
from beneficiaries reduces moral hazard (the beneficiary has something to lose from 
non-performance), while the overall cost to the government is lower. The minimum 
grant is, however, not sufficient to purchase a viable enterprise. It is suggested that 
LRAD should be complemented by an interest rate subsidy programme as proposed by 
Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995). In the latter case no collateral is required. 
Of particular importance is decentralization of approval and implementation of projects 
to provincial and district level, respectively, closer co-operation between various 
government departments and spheres of government, with an enhanced role for district 
municipalities, and what the LRAD policy document refers to as 'the substitution of ex 
post audits and monitoring for a lengthy ex ante approval process' (Ministry for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001). Acquisition of land, from either private or public 
sources, continues to be on the basis of the willing-buyer, willing-seller approach. 
2.3 The Role of Stakeholders 
In addition to the national and provincial Departments of Land Affairs, the White Paper 
on Land Policy also identified the private sector and non-governmental organizations as 
important institutions in the redistribution process. 
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Land Bank 
The DLA has identified the Land Bank as a key institution to assist in the LRAD 
process, for the efficient delivery of the grant. The Land Bank is to administer the 
LRAD grant on behalf of the Department, thereby allowing it to: 
* Speed up access to grants for applicants; 
* Introduce good control measures for assessing and awarding LRAD grants; 
* Provide loan financing for LRAD applicants at the same time as the grant. 
The advantage of having the Land Bank administer the LRAD grant is that the size of 
the grant will determine the extent of the loan finance. By administering both the grants 
and the loans the Bank provides a "one-stop shop" for applicants. Applicants who do 
not meet standard Land Bank criteria will be redirected to the DLA. It also provides the 
Land Bank with the potential to dramatically expand its business. In 2001/02 financial 
year the Land Bank received R50 million from the DLA for release of LRAD grants 
simultaneously with loan funding. To date, other commercial banks have not been given 
the same opportunity as the Land Bank. 
NGOs 
NGOs play several different roles regarding land reform issues. Some NGOs have been 
involved in protecting/assisting communities threatened with removal from their land . 
Others lobbied government for land reform, conducted research on land and rural 
development issues, worked with disadvantaged communities and helped them to 
establish organisations which could speak for them. In KwaZulu-Natal , AFRA is a 
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National Land Committee (NLC) affiliate that works with black rural people, 
. particularly the marginalized, who have been dispossessed of their land, are subject to 
insecure tenure, or who do not have the resources to access land. Lima Rural 
Development Foundation has been actively involved m LRAD as design agents 
(Greene, 2002) . LIMA is a non-governmental, non-profit company registered in terms 
of Section 21 of the Companies Act. Lima's project implementation is in KwaZulu-
Natal and the Eastern Cape, but consults throughout South Africa. Lima's objectives 
are to provide an integrated rural development service to rural communities through the 
establishment of appropriate institutions, local economic development and training to 
empower rural people, particularly women, in their own development efforts, in order 
to overcome poverty . Other local organisations are also actively involved in land 
reform issues, i.e. KWANALU - a farmer representative organisation - and Agrilink II 
Project - a USAID funded project which facilitates land transfers, work with farmers, 
the Land Bank and other institutions to help emergent farmers access agricultural land. 
In August 1995 the NLC (organisation that represent other NGOs in different 
provinces) , in their Land Reform Proposal , suggested that the NGOs should assist with 
the development of community structures and facilitate needs assessments and planning, 
through participatory methodologies. NGOs should also have a role in disseminating 
information to communities so that the latter can choose wisely from the options 
available . They argued that "the DLA cannot both implement and monitor its own land 
reform programme" . A mechanism should be established for civil society and 
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community structures, especially the NGO and academic communities, to carry out 
monitoring and evaluation, in partnership with the DLA, at all levels (NLC, 1995). 
The Land Reform Credit Facility (LRCF) 
The Land Reform Credit Facility (LRCF) is a wholesale finance facility, whose aim is 
to stimulate and encourage private sector participation and involvement in the Land 
Reform process. The LRCF was launched by the Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs on 26 May 1999 (DLA, 2000b). It was set up to assist the establishment of 
commercially viable land reform projects, by offering long-term credit with deferred 
repayment schedules to commercial banks that finance land or equity in commercial 
farming enterprises~ Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd., on behalf of the DLA, administers 
the facility, which is co-financed by the DLA, the European Union (EU) and Denmark-
DANIDA (The Danish Agency for Development Assistance). Khula Enterprise Limited 
is an agency of the Department of Trade and Industry, which was established in 1996 
for SMMEs to access credit through various delivery mechanisms like commercial 
banks, retail financial intermediaries, and micro credit outlets (www.khula.org.za). 
The facility operates as a wholesaler, extending credit to commercial banks, or for on-
lending to retail borrowers who conform to pre-determined land reform criteria. Loans 
extended by the LRCF have a deferred repayment schedule to reflect the circumstances 
of the enterprise in question. The EU, Denmark-DANIDA and the UK's Department 
for International Development (DFID) helps to finance organisational and technical 
skills training for land reform participants in projects supported under this scheme. The 
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LRCF was initially capitalised at a level of R63 million, via a R32 million grant made 
by the DLA that was matched by grants from the EU (R29.4 million) and DANIDA 
(RI. 7 million) (LRCF, 2000). Between May 1999 and April 2001, the Facility 
approved loans worth R322 million, with applications for another R34 million pending 
its re-capitalisation. In May 2001, the DLA and the European Union accepted proposals 
to re-capitalise the LRCF. The DLA approved a grant of R60 million during the 
2001102 financial year and the EU is likely to provide a further grant of RIO million 
(LRCF, 200la). ABSA Bank, the facility's largest client, intents to make much greater 
use of the LRCF in future , especially if the DLA accepts a recommendation to allocate 
a portion of the proposed LRAD grants to the LRCF and to fast-track these grants to 
the beneficiaries of projects financed by the Facility (LRCF, 2001 b) . 
Department of Agriculture & Department of Land Affairs 
The Department of Agriculture and of Land Affairs at national level jointly share 
responsibility for the design of LRAD, policy issues and the design of training 
programmes. The DLA is responsible for monitoring flows of funds to the provincial 
level and auditing the use of funds , as well as monitoring and evaluating outcomes 
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001). 
Provincial Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs sit on the provincial grant 
committee and access information from the national monitoring effort to track the 
performance of LRAD in the province. The Departments of Agriculture and of Land 
Affairs have operational structures at local government level . Where both departments 
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have staff in place, they should share responsibilities under LRAD. Local governments 
and municipalities should be requested to provide an audit of agricultural smallholdings 
within their boundaries. The agricultural staff advise on technical and agronomic issues 
relating to farm proposal and offer an opinion concerning its technical and financial 
feasibility. Staff from the Department of Land Affairs could advise on the land price 
and assist with the title search. Because the Land Bank deals with clients needing or 
wanting loan finance or rather, more advantaged beneficiaries, the DLA by default 
deals with poorer clients who do not expect to take loans. 
Another important responsibility of the DLA is the management of State land. The 
extent of State land in South Africa is 25 509 004 hectares, of which 13 332 577 
hectares are the responsibility of the DLA, the bulk of which is in the former 
homelands (Sibanda, 2001). Of the State land for which the DLA is responsible, about 
700 000 hectares are potentially available for land reform and development purposes. 
Much of it is leased, informally occupied or the subject of restitution claims. Rights to 




ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTERS' PERCEPTION 
This section will discuss the research methodology , five phases of the project cycle, the 
duration and constraints of each phase, the roles of the stakeholders and suggestions 
concerning how the LRAD process of land delivery can be improved (refer Appendix A 
for LRAD project cycle). 
3.1 Research methodology 
The following research procedure was followed. As the thesis analyses stakeholders' 
responses in KwaZulu-Natal, stakeholders in the province were interviewed. Information 
was gathered by the author during 2002 in Pietermaritzburg by conducting in-depth 
consultations with different stakeholders such as NGOs, estate agents, financial 
institutions and government departments (DoA and DLA). Some of the main issues 
discussed with stakeholders during interviews were: (a) their roles, (b) familiarity with 
the LRAD grant and (c) how to improve the process of land redistribution. 
The main objective was to study how the process of land redistribution could be 
expedited. Therefore a structured questionnaire (refer Appendix B) was used to 
determine the length of the LRAD process of acquiring land (project cycle divided into 
five phases) . The project cycle differs slightly depending on whether or not the 
beneficiary is to rely entirely on the amount of grant support available through DLA, or 
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requires a loan available through the Land Bank. For each step, the questionnaire was 
used to determine: (a) who is responsible, (b) time duration for processing an applicant, 
(c) number of applicants processed simultaneously and (d) constraints to successful , 
implementation. The purpose is also to identify factors constraining the land 
redistribution process . 
3.2 Analysis of project phases 
Applicants have to follow a defined procedure to obtain ownership. A redistribution 
project goes through five phases, each phase with different steps. The aim in this study 
was to determine how long it will take for beneficiaries/applicants to obtain ownership of 
land and how the process in each phase can be expedited. The order of steps within each 
phase may vary from one project to another, while phases may overlap. The DLA and the 
DoA, together with the Land Bank, are involved in the implementation of the 
programme. Two of the major proposed institutions under LRAD are (1) the Provincial 
Grant Approval Committee (PGAC) - some of the proposed functions for PGAC are: 
approval or rejection of applications; allocation of planning grant and capital budget to 
the project; assessment of completed business plans; and recommendations to release the 
balance of the planning grant and land grant. (2) District Coordinating Committee (DCC) 
- the DCC's functions are: initial screening of project proposal; formal assignment of a 
project manager to recommend projects; and review of completed business plans and 
recommendation for approval to the PGAC. 
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(a) First Phase: Introduction 
Phase 1, which includes the completion of application forms, submission of projects to 
the DCC (District Co-ordinating Committee) and recommended projects being 
forwarded to the PGAC (Provincial Grants Approval Committee), could take two 
months to complete or process for an individual project. DCC meetings· are held only 
once a month and PGAC meetings are held twice a month. More than twenty projects 
could be processed simultaneously, in this phase. The DoA identifies time as the main 
constraint in this phase, but it also depends on the commitment of the beneficiary to 
giving the required information, completing application forms on time and submitting 
them to the DLA. Time is a constraint because of lack of .skilled staff in the 
Department. The process can be expedited and more applicants can be handled with 
more skilled staff (Urquhart, 2002). 
(b) Second Phase: Planning 
In this phase, design agents draw up the business plan. Only projects that have been 
recommended from the first phase can be processed in this phase. Constraints identified 
in this phase are manpower and finances. The process includes valuations, negotiation 
of land prices and changing of land use, if applicable. After the business plan is 
completed it will be referred to the DCC. The time needed to complete this process 
could be two months or more. Urquhart (2002) explained that if more business plans 
are forwarded to the DCC, additional manpower would be needed to process 
applications. Five to ten projects could be processed simultaneously in this phase. For 
each project, the Department assigns a project manager. To speed up the process, 
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property owners should be engaged, the DLA should increase its manpower and 
beneficiaries are advised to have, on hand, all the requirements that could be asked for. 
(c) Third Phase: Assessment and approval of business plan 
In this phase, business plans approved by the DCC are sent to the PGAC. It is the duty 
of the project manager to forward applications. Again if more applications are sent to 
the PGAC, additional manpower will be needed, or else other applications will have to 
wait for the next meeting in another two weeks' time. All projects approved under 
LRAD must meet certain eligibility criteria. The approval of the grants is based on the 
viability of the proposed project, which takes into account total project costs and project 
profitability. The main constraints in this phase are manpower and time. It could take 
two months for the project to be gazetted and only one project can be processed at a 
time. The length of time needed to complete this phase is more than three months. A 
proposal is to schedule PGAC and DCC meetings every week instead of every two 
weeks and every month, respectively. This will help to process more applications per 
month. However, in a case where the project has secured loan finance, this process is 
unnecessary, as financiers consider the plan as having low risk. It is recommended that 
DLA consider allowing commercial banks (where loans are financed by LRCF) to 
approve grants contingent on loan approval, which would remove a major constraint. 
Extending approval powers to commercial banks has the advantage of identifying 
creditworthy projects quickly and accurately, as private lenders are putting their own 
resources at risk. 
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(d) Fourth Phase: Transfer 
Phase four includes four steps: (a) registration of legal entity; (b) signing of sale 
agreement; (c) appointment of surveyor and (d) transfer of property. This phase can 
only take place after completion of the first three phases, so there will not be a transfer 
of land or of grant money if there is no agreement on the sale of land and if the 
business plan has not yet been approved. The process of transferring property is 
facilitated by the Deeds Office and it can be completed at least three months after 
approval of the grant. Financiers have also complained about the release of grant 
money; projects have been approved but could not start because grant money had not 
been released. Some approved projects have to wait long for the grant money to be 
released and in the process some landowners get impatient and withdraw from selling or 
tend to look for some better offers. The main constraint in this phase is, again, 
manpower, because only one project can be processed at a time. For a single project 
this phase takes about three months. This phase could be expedited by adding more 
manpower for the transfer of property. 
(e) Fifth Phase: Post-transfer support 
After the transfer of the property a mentor should be appointed immediately. The DoA 
carries out this process . The DoA has pointed out that there should not be any 
constraints in this phase if all the other phases were completed well. The balance of 
purchase grant to the applicant can be deposited into the applicant's account, using a 
voucher system. Extension officers will be used to monitor the implementation of the 
business plan, to provide extension support and to monitor the mentors. The process of 
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mentoring is an ongoing process until the project is over. The process can be speeded 
up if mentors are available and ready to provide support and train beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries are expected to co-operate with mentors and avail themselves for training. 
The idea of the analysis of the project cycle was to find the constraints in order to 
improve the rate of delivery. According to the analysis there are three main constraints, 
under-staffed departments, funding and time. The LRAD programme is an applicant 
driven process . In all phases, only projects recommended and forwarded from the 
previous to the next phase are processed. Therefore it is not easy to conclude that if 
twenty applications were processed in a certain phase, then all of the twenty projects 
would be processed in the next phase. According to Urquhart (2002), if some projects 
are not addressed in a scheduled PGAC meeting because of time constraints, 
arrangements could be made for an extra meeting to speed up the process. The DoA 
reported that more commitment by stakeholders could reduce the long process. The 
time duration for the project cycle also depends on the type of project and on the 
number of beneficiaries. At the time of the present study, the two departments had a 
problem with persOIll1el resigning, which meant the loss of skilled staff. If the 
manpower problem can be overcome, more farmers could be settled simultaneously. 
The target for the programme also depends mainly on the available budget. It is highly 
recommended that applicants and stakeholders work co-operatively to speed up the 
process of land redistribution. 
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3.2 Stakeholders' views and roles 
This section discusses the role and views of different stakeholders - NGOs, financial 
institutions, design agents and governmental departments. 
(a) NGOs 
Representatives from the Association of Rural Advancement (AFRA) and from LIMA 
Rural Development Foundation, were interviewed. Local NGOs play different roles 
with regard to the implementation of land reform. AFRA's main concern is that the 
existence of the grant and its operation is not well known amongst intended 
beneficiaries (Ziqubu, 2002) . Ziqubu (2002) suggested that the DLA could be more 
pro-active in marketing the grant amongst rural communities. AFRA also suggested that 
workshops be held to inform communities about the programme. It is important that the 
DLA integrates the new programme with other land reform programmes such as 
restitution, especially in cases where different communities are competing for the same 
land, but through different programmes. 
Ziqubu (2002) observed that very poor people are marginalized by previous grants (e.g. 
SLAG), as they need small areas of land for subsistence purposes. According to Ziqubu 
(2002), the very poor are also marginalized under LRAD. It needs to be pointed out 
that under LRAD, very poor farmers can access the minimum grant, although LRAD's 
main focus is emerging farmers. AFRA also contends that the grant should 
accommodate people who want to improve their land , rather than being available only 
for the purchase of land. There is sympathy for this, but it will be more costly to 
41 
monitor the cost of land improvements than to monitor the purchase of the land. The 
author suggests that land improvements should not fall under LRAD as suggested, as it 
may distract from the focus on land redistribution. LIMA personnel, acting as design 
agents, argue that the process of designing projects for applicants is risky, because 
there is no guarantee that projects will be approved (Greene, 2002). A clear mechanism 
is recommended to ensure that target groups (especially women and farm workers) 
participate in the programme. It was suggested that good communication and co-
ordination with other stakeholders could accelerate the process of land redistribution. 
(b) Financial institutions 
Representatives from the Land Bank, ABSA, Ithala Bank and Homenet Agriplan were 
interviewed. The LRCF offers long-term credit with a deferred repayment schedule to 
commercial banks (and Ithala and the Land Bank), which finance land reform projects. 
The Land Bank is simultaneously providing loan financing and a LRAD grant to 
applicants. The Land Bank was identified by the DLA as a key institution assisting in the 
LRAD process. If applicants apply for Land Bank loan financing or wish to purchase a 
property owned by the Land Bank, the approved loan will be considered as an 'own 
contribution' in determining the grant. The coupling of LRAD with Land Bank loans 
enables farmers with no collateral to purchase a farm of up to R500 000. Under this 
scenario the farmer qualifies for a R100 000 LRAD grant and borrows R400 000 from 
the Land Bank at 10% . Given an expected return in agriculture of about 5 %, this 
implies that the borrower is placed in a serious negative cash flow in the initial years as 
his expected profit is R25 000 per year (5 % of R500 000) while the bond repayment is 
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R40 000 per year (10% of R400 000) (Nieuwoudt, 2003). Greater subsidies in initial 
. years are required in order to avoid cash flow problems. He suggested that as inflation 
increases future profits, that subsidies can be reduced accordingly. Nieuwoudt (2003) 
further contends that other initiatives for land redistribution, such as by commercial 
banks and the sugar millers, all suffer from insufficient initial interest rate subsidies to 
an even greater extent. Farmers with no collateral all face serious cash flow problems 
in initial years and have a high probability of default. To date (2003), the agency 
agreement between the Land Bank and DLA to disburse LRAD grants has expired 
(George, 2003). The Land Bank exhausted their R50 million initial disbursement but 
carried on committing to projects out of its own resources, and it has now approved far 
more than R50 million worth ofLRAD grants. According to George (2003), the contract 
was supposed to be renewed earlier this year, but it has not been renewed because of 
financial problems in the DLA. 
Beneficiaries can apply for loans either through the Land Bank or through any other 
commercial bank. However, commercial banks offer loans to projects which are viable 
and which are more sustainable and to projects that will redeem their loan (Van den 
Hoven, 2002). The maximum funds that a farmer with no collateral can access from 
commercial banks is only R40 000 through coupling with LRAD as banks require 50% 
collateral (Nieuwoudt, 2003). An individual cannot purchase a viable farming enterprise 
with R40 000 and the funding is used for equity share schemes or group purchases. 
Unlike other financial institutions, Ithala Bank acts as both financier and design agent, 
which makes it easier for clients to access funds and therefore reduces the long process 
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of acquiring a grant. Van den Heever (2002) suggested the need for close co-operation 
among all relevant stakeholders, which could improve and accelerate the process. 
Estate agents are also working together with the DLA in selling land, as they know 
property owners. Applicants can also approach estate agents to identify land that they are 
interested in (James, 2002). However, Agriplan estate agent has not facilitated any 
property sales. James (2002) explained that some property owners are not prepared to 
wait for the lengthy process of LRAD, especially if there is no guarantee that it will 
culminate in a sale. 
(c) Design agents _ 
All design agents must be approved by the DLA, although applicants can appoint their 
own design agents and notify the Department, because payment comes from the 
planning grant, which is 15 % of the total grant applied for. Design agents have their 
own interests and incentives, e.g. surety of payment or upfront payment. However, if 
applicants appoint their own design agents without notifying the department, the 
responsibility shifts onto the applicants and can be counted towards their own 
contribution. Most design agents fall under organizations such as S.A. Farm 
Consultants, Metroplan and Ithala Bank. Some are involved in designing only 
commercial projects. The length of the project cycle depends on how long it takes to 
draw up a business plan (designing phase), while the latter depends on the type and size 
of the project (Greene, 2002). It is important for design agents to liaise with applicants 
and the DLA in order to speed up the process, especially when the requirements of the 
44 
applicants are included in the plan. If the applicants appoint their own design agents, 
the DLA will not be liable for payment, if they are not informed in time. 
(d) Department of Land Affairs and Department of Agriculture 
Both Departments of Agriculture and of Land Affairs share responsibilities under 
LRAD. They jointly share responsibility for the design of LRAD, policy issues and 
design of training programmes at the national level. At the provincial level both 
Departments sit on the Provincial Grant Committee and access information from the 
national monitoring effort in tracking the performance of LRAD in the province. Also 
at the provincial level, the DoA provides support and training after approval of grants. 
The DoA offers ad-vice on technical and agronomic issues relating to project proposals 
and offers an opinion concerning their technical and financial feasibility . Staff from the 
DLA could advise on land price and assist with the title search. 
The DLA faces the problem that people who want to participate in the programme are 
not well informed, even though it is the duty of the Department to advertise and inform 
the nation about LRAD (Shabane, 2002a). Shabane (2002a) explained that they are 
faced with many challenges, lack of understanding of policy by service-providers, poor 
quality of business plans by service-providers and lack of appropriate skills in the 
Department. The DLA thinks that the process could be speeded up if beneficiaries 
could put in more effort and be drivers of their projects. The DoA stated that the 
project cycle is long because every phase with steps in the cycle is very important and 
every applicant has to go through it. The DLA, however, will try to reduce the time 
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taken to complete the steps. The logic underpinning LRAD is to link land acquisition to 
support for agricultural development. The duty of the DoA is to offer support and 
training after the approval and transfer of the property. Even though some projects have 




LRAD PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
LRAD relies heavily on private design agents to assist prospective buyers to identify 
willing sellers, prepare their land-use plans and cash flow projections, negotiate sale 
arrangements, arrange finance and to facilitate applications for LRAD. The agents 
recover their costs from a planning grant (15% of the value of the project). Part of the 
costs is awarded at an early stage (i.e. when the Land Bank Loan is approved). This has 
become a source of embarrassment to the DLA, who have paid several million Rands to 
design agents for projects that did not materialise. 
The Land Bank has an agency agreement with the DLA to hold a certain amount of 
money for LRAD applications. The Bank also has its own procedures that an applicant 
has to ' follow before receiving the grant. When the Land Bank receives an application, 
it checks that a person qualifies for a grant and then subjects the application to normal 
loan assessment procedures. If applicants apply for Land Bank loan financing or wish to 
purchase a Land Bank property in possession, the approved loan is considered as 'own 
contribution' in determining the grant size. 
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4.1 What LRAD has achieved to date 
The 30% target of agricultural land in KwaZulu-Natal equates to about 700 000 
hectares of land in KwaZulu-Natal (Shabane, 2002a). LRAD in KwaZulu-Natal started 
slowly. Few applications were received during the first months. To put the necessary 
approval structures in place was time-consuming, while sufficient communication of the 
programme to beneficiaries and potential design agents was lacking. By the end of 
April 2002 the Department had received and processed 105 applications, consisting of 
1100 potential beneficiaries. Of these applications, 53 were approved. 
Ending April 2002, -applications were received as follows: 
88 applications from the Land Bank, with 88 beneficiaries 
12 from Ithala Bank (later 11), with 12 beneficiaries 
One from ABSA Bank, with 35 beneficiaries (farm equity scheme) 
Four from DLA/DoA, with 965 beneficiaries 
From the 12 applications received from Ithala, one applicant later withdrew. The 
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Land Affairs (PDLA) appears not to be 
supporting equity-sharing projects, despite the success of these projects in other 
provinces (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). Only one equity-sharing project was identified in 
their census survey and this project was negotiated and financed privately. One equity 
sharing project received from ABSA (Lowridge Farm), consisting of 35 farm workers, 
was initially approved for the LRAD programme. At a later stage the owner of the farm 
was found to be insolvent and the project was rejected. 
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The DLA showed a major increase in the number of applications received from April 
2002 to December 2002 (2 416, as compared to 105 received by April 2002). Out of 
the 2 416 applications, at least 699 applications were approved and 54 already 
transferred. Applications approved increased significantly since April 2002 (from 53 to 
699). Table 4.1 shows LRAD applications received in KwaZulu-Natal by the end of 
December 2002. Figures include applications assessed by the Land Banle 
Table 4.1: LRAD applications in KwaZulu-Natal, 13 August 2001 - 31 December 
2002. 
Total Applications Number Hectares Grant allocated (R) 
Received 2416 47624 87704339 
Approved 699 17746 19652433 
Transferred 54 5548 3910 240 
Pending 1 521 14800 31 177466 
Withdrawn 125 5584 7772674 
Pending loan and grant approval 589 10 255 29 199232 
Source: Shabane, 2002a. 
Out of the 54 transferred applications 11 (6 men and 5 women) are from Ithala Bank 
and 43 (only 14 are women) from the Land Bank. To date, the 11 individuals from 
Ithala are the only people who benefitted from LRAD. There are still applicants who 
are waiting for approval of the grant. It is disappointing that only 54 applications have 
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been transferred, but part of the reason is that the programme only recently started and 
that time is required for processing applicants. 
According to the DoA, project approval depends on whether the projects meet financial 
norms. These norms have two aspects: the future of land use and whether it continues 
to be used for agricultural purposes; and the future of the occupants in terms of whether 
the financial returns are sufficient. The criterion adopted for non-food security projects 
is the poverty line, i.e. whether a profit margin of R2 000 a month per applicant is 
delivered (off-farm income not included). Food security has, as yet, no criteria. It has 
been suggested that these amounts and rates of return are unrealistic and will vary over 
time (AFRA, 2002). When originally announced, the food safety net programme was 
clearly intended to be a distinct programme that would address the needs of very poor 
households wishing to produce food crops primarily for their own consumption (i.e. not 
for sale). Over time, the concept of a food safety net, as originally applied to 
households engaged in subsistence or non-commercial agriculture, has disappeared 
from official discourse, but the term lives on and is now used by the DLA to refer to 
the lowest end of the LRAD programme, that is the grant of R20 000 (Cousins, 2002). 
Table 4.2 shows the progress with LRAD in other provinces up until May 2003. These 
projects have been approved but not necessarily all transferred. Eastern Cape Province 
leads with the highest hectares approved for LRAD and the lowest is Gauteng. The 
highest number of people who benefited from LRAD is in Mpumalanga, with about 100 
projects. Mpumalanga is the province where LRAD was launched at the Nkomazi 
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Sugar Project. In the first phase of the Nkomazi project, 714 farmers were granted 5 
362 hectares of land, varying in size from 7-10 hectares (Davis , 2001). The second 
phase of the project entails the establishment of irrigation development for 1 828 
hectares of farming land, for the settlement of 241 small-scale commercial sugar 
farmers , 456 women's group members and 50 youth club members. This entails 1 728 
hectares for the 241 commercial farmers, 76 hectares for the 56 women's club members 
and 25 hectares for the 50 youth club members. The grant portion of the project has 
been estimated at R 37 million. According to the Minister 's report (DLA, 2003a) , the 
Nkomazi project has reaped its harvest and realised an income of R100 000, beyond its 
R65 000 expectations . . 
Table 4.2: LRAD application approved in all provinces as to date (May 2003) since 
inception. 
Province Projects Hectares Beneficiaries (no.) 
Eastern Cape 169 64781 1 702 
Free state 299 86558 1 798 
Gauteng 51 2982 1 809 
Mpumalanga 100 51 978 4865 
Limpopo 68 44080 495 
KwaZulu-Natal 43 31 106 1 300 
North West 75 32395 1 040 
Northern Cape 45 41 281 422 
Western Cape 62 32920 4 124 
Total 918 388081 17 553 
Source: Van der Merwe, 2003. 
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In KwaZulu-Natal, 31 106 hectares were approved, which are an improvement, 
compared to 17 746 (refer Table 4.1) realized at the end of 2002. Out of the 43 projects 
approved 30 projects were already transferred by end of May. The 31 106 hectares 
represent about 4.5% of the targeted area (700 000 hectares in KwaZulu-Natal) . The 
number of applications approved in KwaZulu-Natal increased from 53 in April 2002, to 
699 in December 2002 and to 1 300 in May 2003 . 
The DLA has land reform programmes other than LRAD. There are two separate line 
function arms of the DLA in the province (KwaZulu-Natal) , viz. the Provincial Land 
Reform Office (PLRO) and the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights 
(CRLR) . The CRLR is currently finalising the validation of restitution claims. The 
result of this process will be the actual number of valid claims lodged with the CRLR in 
the province. The DLA has agreed that the successful claimants can also qualify for 
LRAD grants (Shabane 2002b). 
The other programme of the DLA that will assist in achieving its 30% target is the land 
reform labour tenant programme. Labour tenants , usually heads of households and their 
dependants above the age of 18, qualify for grants. Most, if not all, labour tenants 
reside on privately owned agricultural land. It is estimated that around 500 000 hectares 
in KwaZulu-Natal will be affected by labour tenant claims. 
Progress is being made in resolving labour tenant cases in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Mpumalanga, where the majority of labour tenants are to be found (DLA, 2003a). This 
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is not only being achieved in terms of the provision of land, but is also ensuring that the 
. land is used productively, to improve the quality of life of labour tenants. For example, 
the Glenbella project in Estcourt in KwaZulu-Natal is benefitting 59 households, who 
have received 800 hectares of land. This land is being utilised for small-scale farming 
and eco-tourism, with the assistance of the previous farm owner, who is· serving as a 
mentor for emerging farmers. 
4.2 Types of Projects 
A range of project types or products , with different objectives, is accommodated within 
the programme, such as food safety net projects, commercial agricultural projects and 
equity-schemes (which has low support in KwaZulu-Natal). Applications to the DLA 
and the DoA involve eco-tourism, cut flowers, poultry, sugar cane and mixed 
agriculture. Given that 2 600 428 hectares of agricultural land in the province are under 
grazing , it is expected that Stockowners will play a more prominent role in assisting 
redistribution. The Department has not received any applications from the timber 
industry, thus far. 
The Land Bank-routed projects are generally more commercially oriented, having 
smaller beneficiary groups , and having larger grants per individual. The DLA-routed 
projects generally involve larger groups with smaller grants per individual. Most of the 
Land Bank applications are for sugar cane, but include poultry, cash crops, dairy and 
stock farming. Out of the 13 already transferred projects approved by the Land Bank, 
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seven are for sugar cane. The average number of applicants per project for grants from 
the Land Bank is three. One approved and transferred project (a co-operative) has 22 
beneficiaries. Two of the transferred projects are sole proprietorship. The Land Bank 
contends that it is better to limit the number of people and to be able to bind members 
to surety, in order to ensure repayment and cost recovery of the loan. Applicants 
through the DLA and DoA have large numbers, ranging from 10 to more than 500 
beneficiaries per project. Maloa (2002) suggests that group projects should be allocated 
with assistance from design agents who have a socio-cultural understanding of 
beneficiaries, to avoid recommending business legal entities that have not proved to be 
successful in the past, e.g. formation of agricultural co-operatives with no distinction 
from the communal-way of life of many rural Africans. 
4.3 Problems and concerns around LRAD 
4.3.1 Implementation issues 
Implementation of the programme was postponed several times, before finally being 
launched in August 2001 (DLA, 2001). The NLC clearly identified the key problem as 
a lack of political will on the part of government (Manji, 2001). Manji (2001) argued 
that some of the reasons for the delay might be unclear policies, lack of understanding 
within the DLA and service providers and lack of staff and trained personnel. Conflicts 
at community level (through land claims) and resistance among the 'beneficiaries' of 
the law can hold up the process of implementation. Walker (1997) cites conflicts at 
community level as an obstacle to implementation. The experience of setting up 
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Communal Property Associations (CPA) serves as an important illustration. Poorly 
articulated demand among the poor and landless, and limited capacity among NGOs in 
the land sector, can also be cited as factors contributing to lack of progress. 
4.3.2 Gender issues 
Despite adoption of the Land Reform Gender Policy in 1997, land reform 
implementation has not adequately delivered on the DLA's commitments to gender 
equity (Walker, 2002). Within beneficiary communities, poor rural women face many 
barriers - social, cultural and economic - to participating in land reform projects and 
processes. The DLA has substantially failed to build the systems and procedures that 
are necessary to ensure gender-sensitive land reform projects and planning (NLC, 
2002). 
In monitoring the impact of land reform on beneficiaries, the DLA has been able to 
measure the level of women's participation (the number of women who have been 
registered as beneficiaries , either as heads of households or as co-applicants), but has 
not developed the indicators and methods for monitoring the extent to which women are 
gaining real benefits from the land reform process. The LRAD policy encourages more 
women to participate in the programme, but it does not clearly state the mechanism in 
doing that. In reality, women and men beneficiaries are treated equally in acquiring the 
grant. Given that African women living in rural areas are substantially represented 
amongst the poor in South Africa, it is imperative that land reform programmes 
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specifically target this group and put in place special affirmative action measures to 
ensure that they are able to gain access to, and control over, land on an equitable basis. 
4.3.3 Budgetary issues 
The new programme of land redistribution contains substantial shifts that have distinct 
budgetary implications for the DLA, the NDA and provincial departments of 
agriculture who receive funds through provincial government budgets. The budgets of 
the two national departments and provincial departments should show increasing 
allocations as the programme is established. The budget allocation is, however, 
decreasing (Mayson, 2001). In part, this is attributed to the DLA under-spending its 
budget for the past- several years. The government's equivocal stance on land reform 
can be inferred from lack of resources being channelled towards achieving it. Less than 
1 % of the national budget is allocated to land reform (Mayson, 2001, Manji, 2001). 
Between the years 1999 and 2001, actual capital expenditure for land redistribution 
declined . The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) allocations for 
redistribution were cut. The National Treasury 's three-year expenditure guidelines for 
land redistribution dropped by 23 %, at a time when spending should have increased 
rapidly to meet government's stated delivery objectives. The major problem was that 
DLA have consistently been under-spending their budgets. 
Land acquisition budgets decreased from R304. 5 million in 2001102 to R 194.7 million 
in 2003/04 (Mayson, 2001) . The current redistribution target set by government, 30% 
of agricultural land over 15 years , would cost about R15 478 million which, if spread 
56 
over 15 years at constant prices, would cost RI 031 million per year. This is far less 
than the entire budget of land reform (Cousins, 2002), which points to a lack of 
coherence between the targets quoted by government, the resources available in terms 
of the land reform budget and the capacity of the DLA to deliver on the required scale. 
According to Walker (1997) and Lahiff (2001), the DLA has routinely failed to spend 
this small sum because of a severe shortage of staff and a bureaucratic structure that is 
cumbersome. Under-spending appears to be still a problem in 2003. 
The 2003/04 budget makes provision for R1.9 billion to be spent on land restitution and 
land reform. Most of" the budget is expected to be used for restitution, because the 
programme is supposed to be finalised in 2005. Lack of transfer for approved projects 
will lead to provincial departments under-spending, e.g. in Table 4.1, out of the 699 
projects approved, only 54 have been transferred, meaning roughly R4 million has been 
spent and about R15 million is highly likely to be remain unspent. 
Tilley (2002) thinks that the declining budget allocations to agriculture may be related 
to the sector's relatively small contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Commercial and small-scale farming contributed less than 4% of South Africa's GDP 
in 2000. Farming in South Africa plays a much smaller role in the economy than in 
many other sub-Saharan countries. This may explain why land reform may have a 
lower priority in South Africa than in other countries on the continent. 
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4.3.4 Land acquisition process 
The targeted land in the LRAD policy is white owned with the aim of correcting the 
skewed pattern of land ownership. Acquisition of land continues to be on the basis of a 
willing-buyer, willing-seller approach. The problem with this approach is that willing-
buyers have to negotiate with landowners, who are not necessarily willing to sell. If 
they do sell, they often retain the best land and allocate the poor quality land to the new 
owners . The process of land acquisition involves beneficiary verification, buyers 
(beneficiaries) negotiating with landowners, project planning, feasibility studies , 
preparation of business plans, valuation of the land and even valuation of beneficiary 
contributions, if necessary. This process takes place in advance of the approval of 
funding for the project. The process could take more than nine months before the 
transfer of land and the grant can be finalized (Urquhart, 2002). This is creating 
uncertainty for property owners and, in cases where the project is not approved, it 
could result in the transaction being abandoned, with no recourse for the disappointed 
seller or design agent or financier who invests time and money in the process. The long 
duration and uncertainty surrounding the purchase of land have undoubtedly led to 
many property owners withdrawing from the process and deterred others from 
becoming involved (James, 2002; Cousins, 2002). 
Cousins (2002) points out that, since grants for the purchase of land are released only 
towards the end of the lengthy project cycle, it means buyers cannot, in practice, 
acquire land through auctions or opportunistic purchases as farms come on the market. 
It also means that planning is abandoned should the price eventually offered by the 
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DLA be rejected by the landowner, thus obliging the applicants (and the DLA) to 
abandon the project or to start the entire planning process over again for another 
property. 
4.3.5 Planning process 
A major problem associated with the planning of the project is its size, which includes 
the number of applicants/members and agricultural activities carried out on their 
project. Their needs, resources and experiences are undoubtedly varied. Some want no 
more than a small patch of land to grow food for household consumption, or land on 
which to graze existing livestock, others have the desire and resources to engage in a 
larger scale of production for the market. Some have years of experience working their 
own land or as employees on commercial farms; others have no direct experience of 
agriculture at all. Yet DLA officials and the consultants appointed by them, on the 
whole, attempted to fit applicants to existing agricultural enterprises, rather than the 
other way round (Cousins, 2002). This has added to the complexity of project planning 
and goes a long way towards explaining the slow pace of implementation. It has also 
had highly undesirable consequences for applicants who have made it through the 
lengthy implementation cycle to the point of land transfer, with a growing number of 
project failures being reported. 
Project planning begins with the offer of a farm, or set of farms, for sale. In some 
cases, the size of the land available is not well matched with the needs of would-be 
beneficiaries , or is beyond their price range. This has typically meant reducing or 
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expanding the size of applicant groups, so that the combined value of the grant matches 
the asking price of the farm, with little or no regard for the potential of the land to 
support that number of people. 
Lahiff (2001) observed some limitation with LRAD, such as the responsibilities 
allocated to the provincial DoA, with no new commitment of resources (e.g. increase in 
the allocation of budget); volume, location and price of the land will be determined 
largely by current owners; no positive mechanism to ensure that more women, the 
unemployed and the very poor can participate; and the integration between different 
legs of land reform - tenure, restitution and redistribution remain unaddressed, as do 
links between land reform and wider aspects of rural development. 
4.3.6 Hindrances to land disposal by the State 
The State currently holds a total of 1.9 million hectares of land within KwaZulu-Natal. 
This land is used for a number of different purposes and is held by various State 
Departments (DLA, 2000a). There is a need to re-look at the land being held by the 
State in order to appropriately allocate ownership, so that the historical consolidation 
processes are redressed, to relieve the State of the cost and the burdens of maintenance 
and management of land, additional to state purposes, so that development takes place. 
There are a number of challenges that face government with regard to disposal of State 
land. Urquhart (2002) identifies some of the reasons for the delay of state land disposal 
in KwaZulu-Natal. The resolution of land claims is happening too slowly. Perceived 
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lack of capacity in respect of the Provincial Land Claims Commission is a problem. 
Urquhart's (2002) suggestion that the price of the state land should depend on its 
productive value is questioned, as this value is subjective. It is suggested that market 
value be used, or that the land be used for restitution cases. There is no objective way 
in which productive value can be determined, as it depends on unobserved expected 
inflation, profitability and interest rates. 
There are several problems with State land. Servitude applications can result in 
complications. Establishment of land rights resulting from beneficial occupation adds to 
some of the delays. State assets are deteriorating, especially during care-taking. In 
some cases, upgrading of irrigation infrastructure is needed before land disposal, e. g. 
R120 000 000 are required over five years to upgrade Makhathini Irrigation Scheme. 
The mechanism for interaction with the national department regarding the FALA land 
(the Financial Assistance Land, which was bought from insolvent farmers and ex-Public 
Works Agricultural Land) in the disposal process is not clear. 
In some cases the land needs to be managed well for a year to prepare it for disposal as 
a going concern, e.g. sugar farms. In other cases, local farmers lack capacity and 
economic productivity has to be encouraged, with the introduction of entrepreneurs to 
initiate the production and marketing aspects to which the beneficiaries can be 
introduced. The farmers, once capacitated, gradually take over the production and share 
in the marketing functions. Examples are Makhathini and Gundrift Farms. These 
developmental aspects often involve prolonged interaction with local tribal authority 
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structures, to ensure buy-in and smooth flow of disposal. Lastly, there is lack of 
capacity in the provincial DLA, as skilled personnel have been resigning. 
4.3.7 Sub-division of farmland 
Constraining the subdivision of large farms is the fact that the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act of 1970 is still law, despite its repeal having been approved by 
Cabinet, some years ago. In terms of this Act, farm owners must get permission from 
the goverrunent to subdivide their land. It will remain in place until the Sustainable 
Utilisation of Resources Bill (which provides for the protection of high-value 
agricultural areas) becomes law. The delay has been attributed to the absence of 
national zoning legislation regulating the conversion of agricultural land into residential 
or industrial uses (Graham, 2000). The Department of Agriculture receives about 300 
applications per month from farmers wanting to subdivide, mostly because of financial 
distress (Aliber and Mokoena 2002). As Lahiff (2002) suggests, subdivision could assist 
in more appropriate project planning for land reform but, once again, this will require 
more sympathy for the kinds of production and livelihood systems likely to be used by 
the rural poor. 
4.3.8 ~entorship programme 
Initially, the idea proposed was that mentors be appointed immediately after approval, 
for a one-year period, which can be extended, to advise the new farmer, introduce him 
or her into the farming community and help establish links to service providers. The 
mentor would be paid RlOOO-RI500 a month, hours of time, plus a travelling 
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allowance. The DoA has been postponing the implementation of the programme since 
LRAD started. Most of the transferred projects have been assisted by previous farm 
owners, private sectors and NGOs. This outstanding issue raises questions and doubts 
about the willingness of the DoA to support the LRAD programme. 
Most sugar growers get support from the South African Sugar Association (SASA), 
Illovo Sugar and Tongaat-Hulett Sugar Limited. Tongaat-Hulett has accepted that a 
properly designed land redistribution programme for the sustainable commercial 
production of sugarcane by a significant core of black cane growers is a preferred and 
viable strategy for the future (Boyce, 2002). 
4.3.9 LRAD project cycle 
According to Urquhart (2002) the process could take nine months to complete. This 
period is lengthy. Some of the reasons that make the process to be long are: (a) during 
the application stage, beneficiaries do not furnish all the required documents, so their 
applications had to be referred back which means that steps are repeated, (b) the 
appointment of the facilitating agent takes long - the process starts with advertising, 
giving time for response and selecting the appropriate agent, (c) transfer and 
registration process - the process is facilitated by the Deeds Office and it can be 
completed within at least three months after approval of the grant, and (d) release of 
funds - since there is a problem of funds in the DLA, some approved projects have to 
wait long for grant money and in the process some landowners get impatient and 
withdraw from selling or tend to look for some better offers. This is discouraging 
63 
because if landowners withdraw in the process, it means beneficiaries have to look for a 
new seller and start the process again. Sellers looking for early payment are 
discouraged to engage themselves in the process of land redistribution. Also, during the 
process, beneficiaries cannot buy land from auctions. 
4.3.10 Capacity of the DLA to deliver and delay projects 
Lack of capacity in provincial departments, and long delays, are major problems. 
According to Ithala, many projects are delayed and sales collapse. It is therefore very 
important for them, when dealing with land transactions, to know whether to structure 
the loan with or without a LRAD grant. If the loan is structured with the grant and later 
the grant is not available, in most cases the deals collapse. It is a waste of manpower to 
apply for a loan, to do the business plan and write the submission. It raises the 
purchaser's hopes and may cost the seller an alternative sale, since he is tied up by the 
contract. Again, if applications are structured without the grant and funds become 
available, it is not easy to then apply after registration, as part of the funds must be 
used to finance the purchase of farmland and the grant is not retrospective. 
Farmers with no collateral cannot purchase a viable farm, as the grant is only R20 000. 
These farmers can, however, couple the LRAD grant with a loan from the Land Bank 
in which case a farm of R500 000 can be purchased. The DoA has run out of LRAD 
funding for this financial vehicle while rate of return data in agriculture indicates that 
prospective farmers will experience serious negative cash flows in initial years 
accessing these funds. 
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The Land Bank has been favoured as the only bank that may approve LRAD 
applications, but the Bank has not processed many of the deals for which it has 
approved grants. It is thus recommended that commercial banks be authorized to 
approve LRAD grants, contingent on loan approval. Extending approval powers to 
commercial banks has the advantage of identifying creditworthy projects quickly and 
accurately, as private lenders are putting their own resources at risk. 
Lastly, there has been little effort to publicise LRAD, or to spread information about 
the programme, especially in the former homelands. Overall, LRAD is not well known 
to the public and in many cases prospective beneficiaries first learn about the 
programme from farmers. In addition, LRAD is said to be a sub-programme of the land 
redistribution programme, but there is currently no other tool to the land redistribution 
programme. The time factor needs addressing. As opposed to the old SLAG 
programme, LRAD is not only about settling people on the land but also about the 
commencement of commercial agricultural activities. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The LRAD programme aims at redistributing 30 % of commercial agricultural land over 
a period of 15 years, meaning at least 2 % of land should be distributed in a year. Some 
of the key principles underpinning the new policy proposal are that all beneficiaries 
make a contribution in kind or cash, it is demand driven and implementation is 
decentralized. The process for acquiring land is lengthy, it could take nine months or 
more. The programme relies heavily on private design agents who are expected to 
recover their costs from the planning grant (15 % of the value of the project). 
Concerns expressed about the new programme are (a) lack of funds in the DLA - this 
may block landowners, design agents and applicants to implement projects; (b) the 
disposal of state land - the process is slow; ( c) the shift from providing grants to 
households ( as was done under SLAG) to providing grants to individuals under LRAD is 
an important improvement in the design of land redistribution from the standpoint of 
women applicants, but the problem is that there are no specific measures in place to 
ensure that they participate and benefit from LRAD grants; (d) the land acquisition 
process - the long duration and uncertainty surrounding the purchase of land has led 
many property owners to withdraw from the process and deterred others from becoming 
involved, which is evidence of missed market opportunities; (e) farmers with no 
collateral cannot purchase a viable farm as the grant is only R20 000. These farmers can, 
however couple the LRAD grant with a loan from the Land Bank in which case a farm of 
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R500 000 can be purchased. The DoA has run out of LRAD funding for this financial 
vehicle while rate of return data in agriculture indicates that prospective farmers will 
experience serious negative cash flows in initial years accessing these funds, and (f) the 
issue of mentorship, which has not yet been implemented. 
The process of land delivery can be expedited, by engaging property owners, by 
overcoming the problem of manpower within departments, especially skilled labour and 
by transferring information to communities so that they understand the process and 
know requirements. DLA should consider more financial institutions to approve grants 
and get private enterprise to investigate areas where there are problems. Design agents 
should be informed. clearly what is expected of them. It is also important that the DLA 
integrates the new programme with other programmes of land reform. This is important 
in cases where different communities are competing for the same land, but through 
different programmes. It has been recommended that the DLA work closely with other 
governmental departments, especially those that are holding State land, for easy 
disposal of State land. 
In KwaZulu-Natal the programme started slowly, but by the end of May 2003, the 
number of applications approved increased. The number of applications approved in 
KwaZulu-Natal increased from 53 in April 2002, to 699 in December 2002 and to 1 300 
in May 2003. Besides the implementers (DoA, DLA and Land Bank) of the programme, 
the programme also involves a wider array of role players than the old programme while 
the involvement of the private sector seems to be increasing. The provincial, DLA and 
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DoA do not have the required capacity to provide the necessary support to the land 
reform beneficiaries. A suggestion is that departments should spend their allocated 
budgets as the need exists and the increase in capital budgets is needed. Under-spending 
in the past has led to budgets being cut. It is highly recommended that the issue of 
mentors hip be addressed, as a matter of urgency . The role of the private sector, 
commodity organizations and private landowners is critical in ensuring that emerging 
farmers receive required support and have access to markets. A balance has to be found 
between speeding up land delivery and ensuring that agricultural land remains 
productive, so that it contributes to economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
Government must try to streamline its policies and procedures, so that landowners who 
wish to sell do not perceive it to be such a serious disadvantage to engage in selling to 
redistribution applicants. There should be a clear and open communication among 
stakeholders , including beneficiaries . Lack of co-ordination between stakeholders will 
undermine the existence of LRAD in the long run. 
Government should encourage sub-division. One way more land could be made 
available on the market for redistribution would be if large-scale commercial farmers, 
especially those who are struggling to service their debts , sold off portions of their 
properties. This will be possible only once the Sub-division Act is repealed. In addition 
to increasing the supply of land for redistribution, this would increase the supply of 
smaller properties that would be suitable for emerging farmers. LRAD discounts the 
impact of Act 70, stating that "permission to subdivide for sale under LRAD will be 
68 
effective immediately upon the launch of LRAD" (Ministry for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, 2001). While this commitment is welcomed, it does not address other 
significant costs associated with the formal subdivision, registration and transfer of 
agricultural land. In addition, transaction costs (registration and transfer) associated 
with subdivision must be reduced. Repeal of the Act will make it easier for the many 
poor and part-time farmers who will be excluded from the proposed LRAD programme 
to finance smaller, more affordable farms. There is no requirement that people should 
stay on farms after obtaining a grant and purchasing the land. One may generate 
income by acquiring land through LRAD, developing it and selling it after some time . 
This may defeat the 'objective of land redistribution and more policy guidance is 
required. 
Land provides crucial support to livelihoods of poor rural people, and a successful land 
reform programme would contribute greatly to poverty reduction by boosting poor 
people's access to productive assets. LRAD may not be the solution for rural poverty, 
since not all rural unemployed are interested in farming or agricultural activities and a 
proposal to government should be to establish other programmes that can contribute to 
rural development and poverty alleviation. 
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SUMMARY 
A sub-programme of redistribution, LRAD, was proposed by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, in 1999 and launched in August 200l. 
Unlike the previous programme (SLAG), beneficiaries make a minimum contribution of 
R5 000 in kind, cash or labour. The amount is paid to individuals rather than to 
households. 
Experience with the land reform programme has shown that it takes time to develop 
systems and mechanisms to implement new programmes. Targeting agricultural 
production specifically, LRAD is intended to speed up delivery, and has reformulated 
the un-met 1994 RDP goal of redistributing 30% of South Africa's farmland within five 
years, and now aims to achieve this goal within 15 years. The 30% target means at 
least 2 % of agricultural land should be redistributed in a year. 
The main objective of this study is to find out how the process of land redistribution can 
be accelerated, given the urgency of land resettlement in South Africa. The study was 
conducted in KwaZulu-Natal, during 2002. Information was gathered by conducting in-
depth consultation and interviews with different stakeholders such as NGO's, estate 
agents, financial institutions and government departments, DoA and DLA. 
The LRAD project cycle is divided into five phases, each phase with different steps. 
The order of the steps within each phase may vary from one project to another, while 
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phases may overlap. The project cycle was analysed to find out how long does it take 
. for a farmer to obtain ownership of land and how the process could be expedited to 
settle more farmers. A complete cycle could take at least nine months or more. During 
this period beneficiaries cannot buy land from auctions, while some landowners are 
reluctant to go through with the process, because it may not result in a land sale. 
Engaging property owners in the process can accelerate land delivery. It is concluded 
that to accelerate the process of land delivery, the DLA should consider reducing the 
length of the project cycle. 
In KwaZulu-Natal the LRAD programme started slowly, by the end of April 2002, the 
DLA had received -only 105 applications (which involved 1100 beneficiaries) for the 
grant. By the end of December 2002, the Department made some progress, out of the 
total application of 2 416, about 699 applications were approved and 54 already 
transferred. By the end of May 2003,43 projects had been approved, with a total of 31 
106 hectares of land and benefiting 1 300 people. This shows an improvement in the 
rate of redistribution since the launch of LRAD. 
Some of the problems around LRAD are: the disposal of State land, there is 
contestation over some particular pieces of state land held by DLA, unresolved land 
claims and lack of capacity in the provincial departments . The DLA needs to integrate 
the new programme with other programmes of land reform, especially in cases where 
different communities are competing for the same land, but through different 
programmes. The DLA must work closely with other governmental departments, 
71 
especially those who are holding State land. There is lack of funds in the DLA due to 
under-spending. To date (2003), the agency agreement between Land Bank and DLA to 
disburse LRAD grants has expired. The mentorship or training programme has not yet 
been implemented, the Department of Agriculture has postponed the implementation of 
this programme several times. There is a lack of capacity in the provincial departments 
and many projects are delayed and the DLA continue to spent more money on paying 
design agents , whereas there is no surety that the projects will materialize. 
LRAD is open to men and women, but there are concerns that women will not be able 
to compete for access to land and grants on equal terms with men, because of their 
weaker social and -economic status. It is imperative that government puts in place 
mechanisms to ensure that women fully participate in the redistribution programme 
through affirmative action measures. The department could dedicate some of the money 
allocated to LRAD to women only. Most women are already employed as farm 
workers. Through equity sharing schemes the wealth redistribution imbalance could be 
corrected . 
A deficiency with LRAD is that at the lower end of the scale, the farmer with no 
collateral and no own contribution cannot purchase a viable enterprise with R20 000. It 
is suggested that as programme complementary to LRAD, that interest rates for farmers 
be subsidised on a declining basis. This will provide access to a viable farming unit for 
a farmer who has no collateral and no own contribution. 
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Sustaining land reform projects or enterprises funded through LRAD and the 
enhancement of rural livelihoods to alleviate poverty remains one of the greatest 
challenges facing government and all stakeholders. The provincial departments, DLA 
and DoA do not have the required capacity to provide the necessary support to the land 
reform beneficiaries. Therefore, the role of the private sector, commodity organizations 
and private landowners is critical in ensuring that the emerging farmers receive the 
required support and have access to markets. 
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APPENDIX A 
LRAD PROJECT CYCLE 
PHASE 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Step 1 
INITIAL CONTACT 
1. Access to information 
-pamphlets 
access to options (verbal! written) 
explanation 
availability of application forms 
2. Registration of enquiry (name; contacts 
details , LRAD/Referred) 
3. Referral - LRAD official refers applicants to 
other programs or departments, or gives further 
LRAD info . 
Milestone: Informed decision taken 
Step 2 
APPLICATION 
1. Explanation of application form 
2. Land identification - database 
- willing seller 
3. Completion of application form by applicant 
option to purchase 
assets/ contribution 
proposed land use plan 
check if more than one application by same 
person submitted 
4. Submission of application form & registration 
of application (allocation of reference number) 
5. Initial assessment by LRAD coordinator. 
Milestone: Submission of completed 





1. Application form directed to dedicated 
DLA/DOA official 
2. Completion of sections 2, 3 & 4 by DLA, 
DOA and District Council 
3. Project proposal completed 
·Step 4 




conformity with District 
council plans 
4. Project proposal sent to DCC with covering 
memorandum. 
refer back multiple application 
for choice by applicant 
Milestone: Submission of project proposal to 
DCC 
Step 5 
PRESENTATION TO PGAC 
1. Commitment of budget 
2. Recommend for approvall refer back to 
applicant 
3. Prioritisation 
4. Assign project manager 
5. Approval of release of portion (3 %) of 
planning grant funding against invoices, to a 
maximum of RIO 000 
Milestone: Recommended projects forwarded to 
PGAC 
2. Release of portion of planning grant 






1. Select design agent 
use database 
applicant does it himself (DIY) 
accredit own agent 
2. Land valuation and price negotiation 
Milestone: Design agent appointed and land price 
agreed to. 
PHASE 2 - PLANNING 
Step 2 
BUSINESS PLAN COMPILATION 





conformity with District council plans 
refer back multiple applications for choice 
by applicant 
finalisation of legal entity 
training needs 
possible mentors identified 
2. Advertise change in land use 
Milestone: Completion of business plan and 
forwarding to DCC and agreement for change in 
00 
-..l 
PHASE 3 - ASSESSMENT AND APPROVAL OF BUSINESS PLAN 
Step 1 
PRESENTATION TO DCC 
1. assessment - checklist of contents 
2. Recommend approval! refer back 
3. Submission to PGAC 
Milestone: Business plan submitted to PGAC 
Step 3 
RELEASE OF FUNDS 
1. release of grant funding 
2. Release of remaining portion of planning 
grant to ensure project completion 
Milestone: Authorization for release of funds 
Step 2 
PRESENTATION TO PGAC 
1. Assessment 
2. Approval or rejection 
3. Memo to PDLA Director (to authorize 
release funds) 
Milestone: Business plan approval or rejection 
and memo to Director 
Step 4 
GAZETTEMENT 
1. Gazettement if necessary 
Milestone: Project gazetted 
00 
00 
PHASE 4 - TRANSFER 
Step 1 
Registration of legal eJ,ltity 
Step 2 
Signing of sale agreement 
Step 3 
Appointment of surveyor 
Step 4 
Appointment of conveyancer 
Transfer takes place 
Milestone: Transfer of property 
00 
1.0 
PHASE 5 - POST-TRANSFER SUPPORT 
Step 1 
APPOINTMENT OF MENTOR 
1. Provision of training 
Step 3 




TRANSFER OF BALANCE OF PURCHASE 
GRANT TO APPLICANT 
Three 'proposed methods 
1. Deposit into applicant's account 
2. voucher system 
3. credit at co-operatives 
Step 4 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND 
SUPPORT BY EXTENSION 
1. Monitor mentor 
2. Monitor implementation of business plan 




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
LRAD PROJECT CYCLE 
PHASE 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Steps Who is responsible Time duration for No. of applicants Constraints 
processing for an processed eg. Manpower or Financial 
individual simultaneously 
1. Informed decision taken 
2. Submission of completed 
application form 
3.submission of projects to 
DCC 
4. Recommended projects 
forwarded to PGAC 
5. Budget committed and 




1. Design agent appointed 
and land price agreed to 
2. Completion of business 
plan and forwarding to DCC 
and agreement for change in 
land use (if applicable) 
Steps 
1. Business plan submitted to 
PGAC 
2. Business plan approval or 
rejection and memo to 
Director 
3. Authorization for the 
release of funds 
4. Project gazetted 
PHASE 2 - PLANNING 
Who is responsible Time duration for No . of applicants Constraint 
processing for an processed ego Manpower or Financial 
individual simultaneously 
PHASE 3 - ASSESSMENT AND APPROV AL OF BUSINESS PLAN 
Who is responsible Time duration for No. of applicants Constraints 






Steps Who is responsible 
1. Registration of legal entity 
2. Signing of sale agreement 
3. Appointment of surveyor 
4 . Transfer of property 
PHASE 4 - TRANSFER 
Time duration for No. of applicants 
processing for an processed 
individual simultaneously 
Constraints 




Steps Who is responsible 
1. Appointment of mentor 
2. Transfer of balance of 
purchase grant to applicants 
3. Implementation of 
business plan 
4. Monitoring and evaluation 
and support by extension 
5. Project closure 
_____ L ____ 
PHASE 5 - POST-TRANSFER SUPPORT 
Time duration for No. of applicants 
processing for an processed 
individual simultaneously 
Constraints 
ego Manpower or Financial 
\0 
.+;:. 
